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Participants included 46 European American, 33 Asian American, 91 Japanese, 160 Indian, and 80 Hispanic
students (N = 416). Discrete emotions, as well as pleasant and unpleasant emotions, were assessed: (a) with
global self-report measures, (b) using an experience-sampling method for 1 week, and (c) by asking partici-
pants to recall their emotions from the experience sampling week. Cultural differences emerged for nearly
all measures. The inclusion of indigenous emotions in India and Japan did not alter the conclusions substan-
tially, although pride showed a pattern across cultures that differed from the other positive emotions. In all
five cultural groups and for both pleasant and unpleasant emotions, global reports of emotion predicted retro-
spective recall even after controlling for reports made during the experience sampling period, suggesting that
individuals’ general conceptions of their emotional lives influenced their memories of emotions. Cultural
differences emerged in the degree to which recall of frequency of emotion was related to experience sam-
pling reports of intensity of emotions. Despite the memory bias, the three methods led to similar conclusions
about the relative position of the groups.
Keywords: culture; emotion; experience sampling methodology; memory for emotions
A consistent and intriguing finding in the subjective well-being (SWB) literature is that
individuals from Asian cultures tend to report lower levels of life satisfaction, less pleasant
emotion, and greater negative emotion compared to North Americans (e.g., E. Diener,
Diener, & Diener, 1995; Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000). Even within the United
States, differences among ethnic groups mirror cross-national findings, with Asian Ameri-
cans reporting lower SWB than European Americans (e.g., Okazaki, 1997, 2000; Schkade &
Kahneman, 1998). Notably, however, most cross-cultural comparisons of emotion have
been based on global measures or recalled reports of emotion, making it difficult to disentan-
gle the meaning of cultural differences. Do cultural differences in global or retrospective
reports reflect differences in everyday emotional experience? Or do cultures differ in their
memory for emotions, or both? Because global and retrospective reports of emotion are vul-
nerable to memory reconstruction (Kahneman, 1999), a deeper understanding of the emo-
tional lives of individuals from different cultures requires a study of online emotion or
measures of emotion as they occur (Flannery, 1999).
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The aims of the present study were twofold. First, this research represents an exploratory
effort at quantifying the frequency of specific emotions, including indigenous emotions,
across cultures. Thus far, these topics have traditionally received treatment in ethnographic
and retrospective self-report studies (Flannery, 1999), whereas the present study sought to
document whether cultural differences exist in online or momentary reports of emotion com-
pared to global and retrospective measures. Although this may be a straightforward descrip-
tive goal, it is of fundamental importance because little is currently known about online
emotional experience across cultures. Empirically establishing the base rates of specific
emotions is necessary because it is possible for cultures to have identical antecedents and
components of an emotion, and yet differ only in their frequency of experience (Flannery,
1999; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). Because the present study used multiple measures, we were
also able to examine whether the different measures converged on the same conclusions.
This is an important question for the measurement of emotions within and between cultures,
because the convergence and divergence of multiple measurement methods can help us
understand the processes underlying cultural differences. For example, if Culture A scores
higher than Culture B on a global measure of x, but there are no differences between A and B
using an online measure of x, this would suggest that memory processes influence cultural
differences in the global measures.
In addition, we explored the contribution of indigenous emotion terms to the measure-
ment of emotion in two of our samples (Japan and India). The indigenous emotions address
an important concern that often arises in culture and emotion research. Do indigenous emo-
tion terms capture the emotional lives of non-Westerners in ways that the “standard” Western
emotion terms do not? To answer this question, we used cluster analyses that included indig-
enous emotions to determine whether indigenous emotions form distinct clusters from the
traditional clusters of pleasant and unpleasant affect that are often found in studies of West-
ern emotions. We describe these indigenous emotions and the analyses in greater detail in the
Method section.
Another objective was to move beyond the descriptive level and explore the influences on
memory for emotion across cultures. This goal was guided by previous research showing
that memory for emotion is a reconstructive process with systematic influences that can
explain memory biases. One source that may guide memory for emotions is a person’s self-
concept. E. Diener, Larsen, and Emmons (1984), for instance, found that when asked to
recall their emotions, individuals scoring high on trait measures of happiness overestimated
the amount of positive emotion they had experienced, whereas unhappy individuals overesti-
mated the amount of negative emotion they had experienced. Similarly, Feldman Barrett
(1997) found that neurotic individuals remembered more negative emotion, whereas
extraverts remembered more positive emotion compared to their online reports. Other influ-
ences on memory have been identified, such as implicit theories (Ross, 1989), current
appraisals (Levine, 1997), stereotypes (Robinson, Johnson, & Shields, 1998), and cultural
theories (Oishi, 2002). However, in the present study, we chose to focus on the influence of
self-concept across cultures.
Although past studies demonstrated that the self-concept influences memory for emo-
tions, the present study extends this work by investigating whether this relation holds across
cultures. To this end, we asked participants to record their emotions online and later asked
them to recall their emotions from the online sampling period. We also included a global
self-report measure of emotions that served as an approximation of the individual’s emo-
tional self-concept. If the self-concept contributes to emotional recall, we would expect there
Scollon et al. / EMOTIONS ACROSS CULTURES AND METHODS 305
to be a sizable relation between the global measure and the recall measure, controlling for
online experience.
The relation between online and recalled reports of emotion raises additional questions
that have not been examined in previous research. For instance, is recalled frequency of emo-
tion related to the online intensity of emotions?1 Because intense emotions seem more mem-
orable, we predicted that intensity would be associated with the recall of frequency of emo-
tions. In addition, if some cultures value or attend to intense emotions more than others,
emotion memory for individuals in those cultures may be more influenced by intense
experiences.
SEMANTIC KNOWLEDGE USE IN THE
RECALL OF LARGE TIME FRAMES
According to Robinson and Clore (2002a), individuals rely on different strategies for esti-
mating their past emotional experience, depending on the frame of reference. In recalling
short, discrete time frames such as momentary recall (e.g., “How happy were you in the past
30 minutes?”), individuals are able to draw on episodic knowledge. That is, they recall spe-
cific instances to inform their judgment of how happy they were. In contrast, when people
recall longer, more abstract time frames (e.g., “How happy are you in general?” or “How
happy were you in the past month?”), they abandon a retrieve-and-aggregate strategy, favor-
ing instead the use of heuristic information or semantic knowledge (e.g., general beliefs
about the self) to “fill in” where specific episodic memories are not accessible or are too diffi-
cult to retrieve or calculate (Robinson & Clore, 2002a).
In a series of reaction time studies, Robinson and Clore (2002b) found strong support for
their model. Their studies capitalized on the fact that reliance on heuristic information is less
effortful and allows for quicker responding in recall. Importantly, if heuristic information is
implicated in recalling longer, but not shorter, time frames, then speed of recall should reflect
a curvilinear pattern, not a linear increase (e.g., greater time to recall longer time frames).
Indeed, Robinson and Clore (2002b) found that participants were as quick at making
recalled judgments about the past year as they were about the past hour. Robinson and
Clore’s (2002b) findings are important because they suggest that distortions in memory for
emotion can be accounted for in systematic ways by identifying the heuristic sources of
information (e.g., self-concept, implicit theories, or current appraisals) on which people rely.
Based on Robinson and Clore’s (2002a, 2002b) theory and findings, in the present study
we chose to treat retrospective reports of emotion that referenced the past month as a mea-
sure that approximates a person’s self-concept. We do not claim that this measure captures
all aspects of individuals’ complex self-concepts. Indeed, one common conception of self-
concept—self-esteem—is notably absent from our definition. However, we chose to focus
on global beliefs about one’s emotions as self-concept rather than self-esteem. We were
interested in what influences memory for emotions; thus, it was appropriate and necessary to
use a global measure that referenced emotions rather than global good feelings about the
self. In fact, Christensen, Wood, and Feldman Barrett (2003) found that global self-esteem
predicted memory for state self-esteem (controlling for online state self-esteem), but only in
a few instances did global self-esteem predict memory for emotions. Our theoretical ques-
tion was whether beliefs about one’s own emotions influence the recall of them.
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PREDICTIONS
Frequency of specific emotions across cultures. Past research has shown that Hispanic
and European American cultures tend to emphasize good feelings, and individuals in these
cultures are more likely to engage in self-enhancement, including the enhancement of posi-
tive feelings (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, &
Betancourt, 1984). This tendency is clearly reflected in the cultural norms for these groups.
Hispanics and European Americans consider pleasant feelings to be much more desirable
and appropriate than unpleasant emotions (e.g., E. Diener, Scollon, Oishi, Dzokoto, & Suh,
2000; E. Diener & Suh, 1999; M. Diener, Fujita, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003). In contrast,
Asian cultures emphasize pleasant and unpleasant feelings nearly equally (E. Diener & Suh,
1999).
An added dimension that has been studied by Kitayama and Markus and colleagues is
social disengagement versus engagement. This dimension captures the degree to which an
emotion affirms the identity of an individual as a distinct, separate entity (disengaged) versus
the individual as part of a social group (engaged). Using retrospective reports, Kitayama et
al. (2000) showed that Japanese indicated feeling more engaged emotions of positive and
negative valence, whereas Americans reported feeling more engaged and disengaged posi-
tive emotions. Menon and Shweder (1994) have also noted the significance of the engage-
ment dimension in India. For instance, Indians are more likely to view shame and happiness
as more similar than shame and anger, because anger is an emotion that is divisive and sepa-
rates people. On the other hand, North Americans consider anger and shame to be more
similar because of valence.
In the present study, although we did not sample all of the same emotions as Kitayama
et al. (2000), we were able to compare across cultures on two relevant emotions: pride and
guilt. In many ways, pride serves as a prototypical disengaged, positive emotion because
pride often results from accomplishing one’s goals or affirming some internal attribute (e.g.,
“I am special”), which reinforces the separateness of the self from others (Kitayama,
Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995).2 In contrast, guilt serves as a prototypical engaged emotion
because it strengthens the bonds between people (e.g., remorse leading to remedy leading to
forgiveness); but guilt is also an unpleasant feeling. Accordingly, we expected Hispanics and
European Americans to report more pride and less guilt than Asian Americans, Japanese,
and Indians in global and retrospective reports because pride is pleasant and guilt is unpleas-
ant. In fact, we expected European Americans and Hispanics to report overall higher levels
of pleasant emotion and lower levels of unpleasant emotion (replicating previous studies).
Because guilt is engaging and pride is disengaging, we expected Asian Americans, Japa-
nese, and Indians to report more guilt and less pride. Given that this is the first study to our
knowledge that uses online measures of specific emotions, predictions for online measures
were more tentative. On one hand, Oishi (2002) found no cultural differences in online emo-
tion between Asian Americans and European Americans, which might lead us to expect no
cultural differences for the online measure. On the other hand, evidence from retrospective
reports indicates clear differences in the frequency of experience of specific emotions, par-
ticularly pride and guilt, across cultures.
What influences memory? We hypothesized that self-concept would predict memory for
emotions across cultures, even after controlling for online emotion. However, we did not
have any theoretical formulations about how this process would vary by culture or specific
emotion. We also predicted that intensity of emotions might be associated with the recall of
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frequency of emotions—especially for cultures that highly value one type of emotional
experience over another. Because Hispanic and American cultural norms emphasize positive
feelings, we predicted that intense pleasant experiences would be implicated in the recall of
frequency of pleasant feelings for these groups, whereas intense negative experiences would
not be implicated in recall of amount of unpleasant feelings. Because Asian cultures tend to
equally value positive and negative (E. Diener & Suh, 1999), we predicted that either inten-
sity information would have no relation to their recall of frequency, or intensity of pleasant
and unpleasant feelings would equally predict memory.
METHOD
PARTICIPANT SAMPLES
We examined three cultural samples within the United States (European American, Asian
American, and Hispanic) and two societies outside of the mainstream Western tradition
(India and Japan). Through these five cultural groups, we hoped to have a diverse sample of
subcultures within one Western nation, as well as two non-Western cultures. We studied col-
lege students so that each culture would be represented by individuals of approximately the
same age, education, and relative income. Thus, these factors would not be confounded with
culture. In addition, we included cultural groups that have largely been ignored in the culture
and emotion literature. Latinos and Indians have received little attention (Biswas-Diener &
Diener, 2001), despite the fact that India is the second largest nation in the world and is lead-
ing the world in population growth, and Latino Americans make up nearly 12% of the U.S.
population and are on the verge of being the largest ethnic minority group in the United
States.
A total of 416 college students participated in this study. Although small in comparison to
some international surveys, our samples were quite respectable by the standards of experi-
ence sampling studies. Some participants did not have experience sampling data due to tech-
nical failures; others did not complete the memory measures. Analyses were computed on
available data; therefore, different analyses reflect slightly different sample sizes. Partici-
pants volunteered and received $25 compensation, or the equivalent monetary incentive for
Japanese and Indian students (not a direct exchange of U.S.$25). Volunteers responded to
advertisements for the study posted on or near campus. At the end of the study, participants
were fully debriefed. Table 1 describes the samples. Portions of the data that examined other
questions are presented elsewhere (on cross-situational consistency across cultures, see
Oishi, Diener, Scollon, & Biswas-Diener, in press; on dialectical emotions, see Scollon,
Diener, Oishi, & Biswas-Diener, in press).
MEASURES
At the beginning of the study, participants completed global report measures concerning
emotions, after which they began the week-long experience sampling portion of the study.
At the end of the week, participants recalled their emotions from the experience sampling
week. All materials were in English, except for those presented to Japanese respondents.
Given India’s diversity of languages and the fact that English is one of the country’s official
languages, translation of materials was not necessary for the Indian college students.3
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Global measure. Before beginning the experience sampling portion of the study, partici-
pants indicated how much of the time they typically felt eight specific emotions (described
later) during the past month on a scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). As Robinson and
Clore (2002b) have shown, when participants are asked to reference a large time frame, they
rely on heuristic information to respond to the question, rather than careful retrieval and
aggregation of affective memories. Thus, this measure can be considered a general measure
of affect that approximates a person’s self-concept. Importantly, this measure bears no over-
lap in time with the experience sampling or recalled measures.
Experience sampling of the week. During their waking hours, participants carried a de-
vice that was preset to sound an alarm at random moments throughout a 2- to 3-hour interval
5 times a day for 7 days.4 When signaled, participants completed mood ratings according to
how they were feeling “right before the alarm sounded.” We specified the time “right before
the alarm” to remove any effects of the alarm itself. Although in most instances respondents
could complete the mood form immediately after being signaled, if it were impossible to do
so at the moment (e.g., during a test), participants were allowed to complete the form up to 30
minutes after the alarm sounded. Participants were explicitly told not to complete the mood
ratings beyond the half-hour time frame. The average response rate was 75%. Participants
completed additional mood ratings when they first woke up and before going to bed each
day. When signaled, participants recorded to what degree they were feeling the specific emo-
tions on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (with maximum intensity).
Proportion or frequency of emotions. Ratings for each occasion were transformed into
dichotomous variables indicating whether the emotion was currently being experienced
(i.e., any nonzero response) or not (i.e., any zero response). We then computed the propor-
tion of time each specific emotion was reported over the entire week. These values specifi-
cally reflect the amount of time various emotions were experienced and do not take into
account the intensity of those emotions.
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TABLE 1
Participant Samples
Age
Culture n Female (%) M SD
Japanesea 91 63 20.2 2.3
Indianb 160 64 21.4 2.6
Asian Americanc 33 67 20.6 1.9
Hispanicd 80 79 21.7 5.5
European Americanc 46 83 20.9 4.3
Total 416 68 21.1 3.5
a. Recruited from International Christian University and Meisei University, both in Tokyo.
b. From Utkal University in Bhubeneswar, a city in the state of Orissa, Indian Institute of Management, President’s
College, Jadavpur University, Indian Institute of Social Welfare and Business Management, Calcutta University-
Raja Bazaar, St. Xavier’s College, and Ramakrishna Mission at Nurendrapur, all in and around Calcutta.
c. From the University of Illinois.
d. From California State University at Fresno. Hispanic respondents were recruited only if they spoke Spanish at
home.
Intensity of emotions. We computed the (week-long) mean level of intensity for each of
the eight emotions by summing a person’s ratings on each emotion and dividing by the total
number of occasions on which the emotion rating was nonzero. In other words, this score
reflects the mean level of intensity for a particular emotion only when that emotion was felt
(for a detailed discussion of the rationale for this procedure, see E. Diener, Larsen, Levine, &
Emmons, 1985).
Retrospective measure. On the last day of the experience sampling week, participants
recalled the percentage of time they experienced each of the specific emotions during the
week in which they carried the signaling device. Responses could range from 0% to 100% of
the time for each emotion. Instructions specified that the percentages did not need to sum to
100% because participants may have felt more than one emotion at the same time. Note that
this is a measure of the proportion of time a person experienced specific emotions.
Choice of emotions. For each type of assessment (global, online frequency, online inten-
sity, and recall), we sampled four positive emotions (pride, affection, joy, and happiness) and
four negative emotions (irritation, guilt, sadness, and worry).5 These emotions were selected
to represent major forms of pleasant and unpleasant emotion (E. Diener, Smith, & Fujita,
1995) and served as a compromise between an exhaustive list of emotions and the quick,
short list required by the experience sampling method (for a practical review of experience
sampling methodology, see Kim-Prieto, Fujita, & Diener, 2004). Recognizing that we could
not sample all the emotions, these eight emotion terms were selected because they are
diverse and appear in many emotion systems such as Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988);
Shaver, Wu, and Schwartz (1992); Plutchik (1980); and Izard (1977). In addition, we
avoided extreme emotions such as “rage” and “elation” because they are infrequent, and we
were interested in everyday common emotions.
One caveat to this selection of emotions is that these terms are established meaningful
terms in Western theories of emotion (although Shaver et al. [1992] found these emotions in
the Chinese emotion lexicon). Conceivably, the English emotion lexicons might not ade-
quately represent the emotional lives of non-Western individuals. Therefore, we also per-
formed hierarchical cluster analyses on the frequency of online emotions which included
two pleasant indigenous emotions (shitashimi and fureai) and two unpleasant indigenous
emotions (oime and rettokan) in the Japanese sample, and one pleasant (sukhi) and one
unpleasant (aviman) indigenous emotion in the Indian sample, in addition to the previously
mentioned eight emotions. The cluster analyses should reveal whether indigenous emotions
form distinct clusters from the traditional clusters of pleasant and unpleasant affect com-
monly found in studies of Western emotion.
The indigenous emotions are unique in that they do not have English equivalents. Never-
theless, we will try to give the reader a general sense of what it means to feel these emotions,
keeping in mind that there is no one-to-one translation of these emotions. For example, the
Indian term aviman is best described as a feeling of prideful loving anger, and the term sukhi
is similar to peace and happiness. A Japanese individual might use the term fureai when she
feels a sense of connectedness to someone else. Shitashimi is used to describe a sense of
familiarity. Oime refers to a feeling of indebtedness, and rettokan means to feel inferior. A
noted similarity among these indigenous emotions is that they tend to implicate the person’s
social world. This is consistent with Mesquita’s (2001) notion that in collectivist cultures, an
emotion reflects the self in relation to others, whereas in individualist cultures, emotions
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refer to the self as a separate, bounded entity. Unfortunately, indigenous emotion ratings for
Japanese and Indians were not available in the global and recall measures.
RESULTS
DO CULTURES DIFFER IN FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC EMOTIONS?
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) performed on the frequency of
specific emotions revealed significant differences between cultures, Wilks’s Lambda = .50,
F(32, 1,381) = 8.98, p < .001, η2 = .16. Univariate tests revealed significant cultural differ-
ences for all emotions, Fs(4, 381) > 3, ps < .02.6 Figure 1 shows the mean levels of frequency
of specific emotions for each cultural group. Several interesting points are worth noting
about this figure. First, there is considerably more cultural variability in the pleasant emo-
tions than in unpleasant emotions, a finding that replicates Eid and Diener (2001). As
expected, the largest difference between cultures was in reports of pride, F(4, 381) = 25.07,
p < .001, η2 = .21. Hispanic Americans felt the most pride (M = 81.0%, SD = 23.7), and the
three Asian cultures reported the lowest frequency of pride, with Indians reporting the least
pride (M = 36.1%, SD = 32.5). These findings are consistent with previous formulations
about pride in Asian societies (M. Diener et al., 2003; Kitayama et al., 1995, 2000; Menon &
Shweder, 1994)—that pride is not highly valued because it separates individuals from oth-
ers. Interestingly, because Hispanic culture is also purportedly collectivistic (e.g., Triandis
et al., 1984), collectivism alone cannot explain cultural differences in mean levels of pride. If
it did, we would expect Hispanics to be very low in pride, but instead they are the highest.
Another notable feature of Figure 1 is that cultural variability for sadness was virtually
zero, as indicated by nearly identical means for the different groups but also F(4, 381) = .18,
p = .95, η2 = .002, whereas the cultures varied more in terms of guilt, F(4, 381) = 4.64, p <
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Figure 1: Amount of Specific Emotions Reported Online by Cultural Group
.01,η2 = .05. Consistent with Kitayama et al. (1995, 2000), Japanese (M = 37.4%, SD = 28.2)
and Asian Americans (M = 33.8%, SD = 26.5) reported more guilt than European Americans
(M = 26.0%, SD = 25.0) and Hispanics (M = 28.4%, SD = 27.3). Unexpectedly, however,
Indians reported the least amount of online guilt (M = 23.0%, SD = 24.8).
In general, the ordering of the cultural groups remained relatively consistent across the
specific emotions, with Hispanic and European Americans feeling the most pleasant and
least unpleasant in online reports. The three Asian cultures were consistently lower in pleas-
ant affect and higher in unpleasant affect, although their ordering varied slightly depending
on the specific emotion. The pattern of cultural differences resonates with previous studies
using global and retrospective reports (e.g., E. Diener, Diener, et al., 1995) and echoes the
finding that European American and Hispanic cultures tend to place greater emphasis on
good feelings (e.g., E. Diener et al., 2000; Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 2000; Triandis
et al., 1984) and rate pleasant emotions as more desirable and appropriate than individuals in
Asian societies (E. Diener & Suh, 1999; Eid & Diener, 2001).
As expected, cultural differences also emerged in global and recalled reports of pride,
F(4, 406) = 22.97, p < .001, η2 = .19, and F(4, 373) = 21.72, p < .001, η2 = .19, respectively.
Specifically, Hispanic (M = 4.62, SD = 1.7) and European Americans (M = 3.69, SD = 1.3)
reported the highest levels of pride, whereas Indians (M = 2.71, SD = 1.5) reported the lowest
pride in global measures. Hispanic and European Americans also recalled the most amount
of pride (Ms = 46.8 and 27.0, SDs = 32.0 and 26.2, respectively), and Asian Americans
recalled the least amount of pride (M = 13.2, SD = 13.4), followed by Indians (M = 16.4, SD =
19.4). Cultural differences emerged in global reports of guilt, F(4, 406) = 8.80, p < .001,η2 =
.08, with Japanese scoring the highest (M = 3.04, SD = 1.5), followed by Hispanics (M =
2.48, SD = 1.2) and Asian Americans (M = 2.45, SD = 1.0). European Americans scored low-
est in global reports of guilt (M = 2.09, SD = .78). No significant group differences emerged
for recall of guilt, F(4, 374) = 2.09, p = .08, η2 = .02, although the Japanese again scored the
highest (M = 17.0, SD = 22.2).
DO INDIGENOUS EMOTIONS ADD TO CONCLUSIONS
ABOUT AVERAGE EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING?
To answer this question, we submitted dissimilarity matrices of emotion terms to a hierar-
chical cluster analysis using complete linkage.7 As shown in Figures 2 and 3, for the Japa-
nese and Indians, two clusters of pleasantness and unpleasantness emerged at the highest
level. Importantly, the indigenous emotions did not form separate clusters in either sample.
Instead, the indigenous emotions simply clustered with the expected pleasant and unpleasant
clusters. Interestingly, pride clustered with the negative emotions for Indians, and was clos-
est to the indigenous emotion aviman. The proximity of pride to aviman makes sense, given
the definition of aviman (“prideful loving anger”). For the Japanese, however, pride clus-
tered with the positive emotions, although of all the positive emotions, pride was the closest
to the negative emotions. For the Japanese sample, the pleasant cluster was bifurcated into
happy-joyful versus shitashimi-fureai-affectionate-proud and the unpleasant cluster split
into irritated-worried versus sad-rettokan-oime-guilt at the second highest level.
Examination of the amount of time Japanese and Indians reported feeling the indigenous
emotions showed that these emotions were either uncommon or experienced to the same
degree as the other eight emotions. For example, the most frequently experienced indige-
nous emotion among the Japanese was shitashimi (M = 63%, SD = 27.3), whereas happiness
was reported, on average, 76% of the time (SD = 22.1). The negative indigenous emotions
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(oime and rettokan) were even less frequently reported (Ms = 29% and 31%, SDs = 27.2 and
29.3, respectively), whereas the least frequently reported nonindigenous negative emotion
for the Japanese was sadness (M = 38%, SD = 30.4). Indians reported feeling sukhi 78% (SD
= 27.4) of the time, whereas they felt happy, on average, 85% of the time (SD = 16.9).
Aviman was reported only 32% of the time (SD = 32.4). Although this was more frequent
than guilt (23%, SD = 24.8), it was much less frequent than worry, which was reported 61%
of the time (SD = 27.4). In sum, the present analyses indicate that these specific indigenous
emotions are fairly well-represented by Western emotion words.
Cluster analyses were also conducted on the other three cultural groups. Again, the high-
est level of clusters divided pleasant and unpleasant emotions in each culture, suggesting that
there is a tendency for individuals who experience one pleasant emotion to experience the
other pleasant emotions as well, over time. Likewise, individuals who frequently felt one
unpleasant emotion also felt the other unpleasant emotions. It is important to note that the
general clustering of pleasant and unpleasant emotions together in all five cultural groups
does not contradict the idea that people in different cultures might classify different emotions
as desirable or undesirable (or positive or negative in the narrative sense). Our data do not
speak to the perceived normative desirability of the emotions. Instead, our cluster analyses
point to a general individual difference tendency such that some individuals are prone to
a spectrum of pleasant emotions, and some individuals are predisposed to a variety of un-
pleasant emotions, and these two dispositions are separable across cultures.
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Figure 2: Dendogram From Cluster Analysis of Japanese Indigenous Emotions With Translated English
Emotions
NOTE: Clustering method was complete linkage. Shitashimi, fureai, rettokan, and oime are indigenous Japanese
terms.
DO CULTURES DIFFER ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEASURES?8
Because the online frequency and recall scores were based on a 100-point scale whereas
the other ratings were based on a 7-point scale, it was first necessary to standardize the mea-
sures so they would be in the same metric. We then performed a repeated measures
MANOVA on the standardized emotion terms (with the four methods of assessment serving
as the within-subjects factor). Table 2 shows the results of the MANOVAs, which were con-
ducted separately for each emotion to aid in interpretation. Method × Culture interactions
emerged for all emotions (indicating nonparallel profiles), but effect sizes for these interac-
tions were miniscule—the largest effect size being .06 for joyful and irritated. No main
effects for method emerged. However, a main effect for culture emerged for every emotion.
Most of the effect sizes for culture were small, but in a few instances this culture effect was
larger. Specifically, the effect sizes (η2) for culture were .14 for happiness and .10 for joy, and
the largest effect size for culture was for the emotion pride (η2 = .27).
Aggregation of emotion terms. In the interest of brevity, we do not present all 160 means
for each emotion for each method of assessment for each cultural group (i.e., 8 × 4 × 5).
Instead, we created composite scores from the specific emotions, and describe the conver-
gence of measures based on these aggregated terms.
For all measures, happiness and joy were averaged to create a pleasant emotion (PE)
score, and guilt, irritation, sadness, and worry formed an unpleasant emotion (UE) score.
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Figure 3: Dendogram From Cluster Analysis of Indian Indigenous Emotions With Translated English
Emotions
NOTE: Clustering method was complete linkage. Aviman and sukhi are indigenous Indian emotion terms.
This choice of aggregation was based on several convergent lines of research. First, the
dimensions of pleasantness and unpleasantness have been replicated in multiple studies
using cross-cultural samples (e.g., Kim-Prieto, Diener, & Fujita, 2004; Scollon et al., in
press), even in studies that began with indigenous emotion terms rather than using transla-
tions of English emotion words (e.g., Shaver et al., 1992; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984).
Second, Scollon et al. (in press) and Eid and Diener (2001) found less cultural variability in
unpleasant emotions, and Scollon et al. (in press) found strong evidence that the negative
emotions consistently covaried with one another, regardless of culture. Thus, we elected to
aggregate the four unpleasant emotion terms (guilt, irritation, sadness, and worry). See Table
3 for reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alphas).
For pleasant feelings, however, there appears to be greater cultural variability. In particu-
lar, pride and affection are sometimes associated with negative emotions, especially in Asian
cultures. First and most simply, the mean levels of pride reflect differences in cultural norms
regarding this emotion, replicating other cross-cultural investigations of pride (e.g., Stipek,
1998). Second, Kim-Prieto et al. (2003) conducted a cluster analysis of emotion in 46
nations and found that at higher level clusters, pride clustered with the negative emotions in
India and other non-Western societies. In the present study, pride also clustered with the
unpleasant emotions for the Indian sample. Third, Scollon et al. (in press) found that pride
loaded on the pleasant and unpleasant factors for Asians, and affectionate showed some mild
associations with unpleasant feelings as well. Similarly, Shaver et al. (1992) noted that
among Chinese respondents, love did not emerge as a basic emotion with positive valence.
Instead, for the Chinese, love-related concepts clustered near sadness and other negative
emotions related to attachment and loss. Lutz’s (1982) observation that the Ifaluk have an
emotion called fago that represents a combination of love, sadness, pity, and compassion
also converges with the notion that affection may not be purely positive in non-Western
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TABLE 2
Multivariate Tests and Effect Sizes
Method Culture Method Culture
Affectionate Λ = 1.0, F(3, 346) = .26, F(4, 348) = 7.47**, Λ = .94, F(12, 916) = 1.96**,
η2 = .00 η2 = .08 η2 = .02
Happy Λ = 1.0, F(3, 351) = .32, F(4, 353) = 14.90**, Λ = .91, F(12, 929) = 2.76**,
η2 = .00 η2 = .14 η2 = .03
Joyful Λ = 1.0, F(3, 348) = .45, F(4, 350) = 10.15**, Λ = .84, F(12, 921) = 5.36**,
η2 = .00 η2 = .10 η2 = .06
Proud Λ = .97, F(3, 327) = 3.27**, F(4, 329) = 29.86**, Λ = .93, F(12, 865) = 2.13**,
η2 = .03 η2 = .27 η2 = .03
Guilty Λ = .96, F(3, 307) = 4.29, F(4, 309) = 4.52**, Λ = .92, F(12, 813) = 2.19**,
η2 = .04 η2 = .06 η2 = .03
Irritated Λ = .98, F(3, 348) = 2.14, F(4, 350) = 2.62**, Λ = .83, F(12, 921) = 5.64**,
η2 = .02 η2 = .03 η2 = .06
Sad Λ = 98, F(3, 335) = 2.01, F(4, 337) = 1.55**, Λ = .92, F(12, 887) = 2.49**,
η2 = .02 η2 = .02 η2 = .03
Worried Λ = .99, F(3, 350) = 1.68, F(4, 352) = 5.75**, Λ = .92, F(12, 926) = 2.49**,
η2 = .01 η2 = .06 η2 = .03
NOTE: Multivariate test statistic was Wilks’s Lambda (Λ). The repeated measures factor was Method, and refers to
the four types of measures (global self-concept, online frequency, online intensity, and recalled emotion).
**p < .05.
cultures. In contrast, happiness and joy are generally rated as desirable in most cultures
(Sommers, 1984). Indeed, Shaver et al. (1992) found that happiness/joy emerged as a basic
emotion concept in several cross-cultural samples, including the Chinese. Therefore, in
aggregating across the pleasant emotions, we elected to use a 2-item PE scale (formed by
averaging happiness and joy). See Table 3 for reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alphas).
Cultural differences emerged on all measures of PE and UE, Wilks’s Lambda = .62, F(32,
1,278) = 5.62, p < .001. Univariate tests indicated cultural differences on all measures except
frequency of online UE and recall of online UE (see Table 4 for means and univariate F tests).
Table 4 also shows that, across the board, participants tended to underestimate their emo-
tional experiences in their recall. Whereas the overall mean frequency of online PE was 81%,
the overall mean recall of PE was 49%. Similarly, participants reported negative emotion on
average 45% of the time online but recalled that figure as only 25%. These underestimates
most likely reflect the difficult nature of the task. In particular, participants may have dis-
counted or not remembered instances in which they felt an emotion only slightly.
As shown in Table 4, Hispanic American respondents scored highest on all measures of
PE, followed by European Americans. The three Asian groups were consistently lower
on the PE measures. In general, the reverse was true for negative emotion—Hispanic and
European Americans were very low on these measures, whereas the other three groups
(especially the Japanese) were consistently higher. This pattern is most striking in Figures 4a
and 4b, where we have standardized the measures to the same scale so that comparisons can
be made. Although the standardized measures could obscure some of the details due to dif-
ferent variances, an interesting pattern still emerges—the rank ordering of the groups is
maintained across the different measures. Again, the groups varied less on the unpleasant
emotions (as indicated by less spread of the horizontal lines).
DOES SELF-CONCEPT PREDICT MEMORY
FOR EMOTIONS ACROSS CULTURES?
For the memory analyses, we again chose to use indices of PE and UE for the three mea-
sures (global, online, and recall) for two reasons. First, we did not have predictions about
how the use of self-concept information would vary by specific emotion or by culture.
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TABLE 3
Internal Consistency (alphas) for Pleasant and
Unpleasant Emotion Indices by Method and Culture
Pleasant Emotiona Unpleasant Emotionb
Frequency Intensity Frequency Intensity
Culture Global Online Online Recall Global Online Online Recall
European American .84 .74 .93 .77 .71 .85 .70 .68
Asian American .85 .93 .94 .91 .72 .86 .76 .60
Japanese .67 .92 .90 .89 .54 .86 .79 .77
Indian .84 .92 .92 .87 .61 .86 .82 .80
Hispanic .86 .91 .93 .89 .66 .86 .80 .75
a. Computed from two items: happy and joyful.
b. Computed from four items: guilty, irritated, sad, and worried.
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Second, the composite scores form more reliable measures and provide a useful framework
for interpreting our findings.
We should note, also, that the analyses concerning memory for emotions do not include
indigenous emotions because we were interested in making comparisons across groups and
across measures, and therefore needed assessments that would be isomorphic. We recognize
that our findings must be interpreted with this limitation in mind.
To determine whether self-concept predicts memory for emotions after controlling for
online reports, we regressed the retrospective measure of emotion (taken at the end of the
experience sampling week) onto both the online and global measures. We performed this
analysis separately for each cultural group, and for PE and UE separately, resulting in 10 sep-
arate equations. Table 5 presents the standardized betas for each regression. These betas
indicate the unique contribution of online emotion and the unique contribution of global self-
beliefs to the recall of that emotion, while controlling for the other predictor. As one might
expect, the significant and large betas for online emotion indicate that people are fairly accu-
rate in their recall. Clearly, people have a relatively accurate sense of their own emotional
lives—if they did not, this would be alarming. Nevertheless, the global measure still contrib-
utes to recall even after controlling for online emotion, as evidenced by the significant betas
for the global measure for all groups. In some cases, global self-concept was as strong or
stronger of a predictor of memory than online experiences. Furthermore, global self-concept
influenced memory in all five cultural groups, and in predicting memory for pleasant and
unpleasant emotion.
Interestingly, there were group differences in the degree to which global self-concept
influenced memory for emotions. For instance, online emotion was less important to the
recall of pleasant and unpleasant emotion in the Hispanic group, and online emotion was a
relatively stronger predictor of recall for European Americans than was global self-concept.
Although these differences are interesting, we do not have a strong theoretical explanation
for why some cultures would use self-concept more. We elaborate on this issue in the
discussion section.
IS MEMORY FOR AMOUNT OF EMOTION EXPERIENCED
(I.E., FREQUENCY) INFLUENCED BY INTENSITY OF ONLINE EXPERIENCE?
To test this question, we regressed recalled emotion onto intensity of online emotion and
frequency of online emotion. Because the recall measure was, by definition, a frequency
measure, we would expect there to be a high degree of association between the two. How-
ever, if intensity of online emotions is also implicated in people’s memories, then we would
expect intensity of emotion to add to the prediction of recall even after controlling for online
frequency. Table 6 shows the standardized betas for frequency and intensity by cultural
group for PE and UE separately. Interesting cultural differences emerged in the degree to
which intensity predicted recalled reports of frequency. Notably, intensity of PE was related
to recalled frequency of PE among European American, Indian, and Hispanic American par-
ticipants, suggesting that their memory for the frequency of positive emotions was colored
by the intensity of their positive emotions. Among Japanese respondents, intensity of PE did
not contribute to recalled PE (β= .15, t = 1.40, p = .17), but intensity of UE predicted recalled
UE (β = .21, t = 2.34, p = .02). Intensity of online UE also strongly predicted recalled UE for
Indian participants (β = .40, t = 6.28, p < .001). Interestingly, for the Hispanic American
group, intensity of PE entirely predicted recall of PE (β = .45, t = 3.75, p < .001), whereas
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Figure 4b: Standardized Measures of Unpleasant Emotion (UE) by Cultural Group
NOTE: NOTE: EA = European American; AA = Asian American; J = Japanese; I = Indian; H = Hispanic; freq. = fre-
quency; int. = intensity.
Figure 4a: Standardized Measures of Pleasant Emotion (PE) by Cultural Group
NOTE: EA = European American; AA = Asian American; J = Japanese; I = Indian; H = Hispanic; freq. = frequency;
int. = intensity.
frequency of PE did not predict recall. In addition, intensity of UE was completely unrelated
to recalled UE (β = .00, t = .02, p = .99) for Hispanics.
These results suggest that retrospective reports of emotions are contaminated by inten-
sity, but the degree to which intensity of online experience is implicated in memory varies by
culture and the valence of emotion. Hispanic Americans tended to place greater weight
on intense pleasant experiences but no weight at all on intense negative emotions. Indian
respondents weighted intensity quite heavily, regardless of valence.
DISCUSSION
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN SPECIFIC,
AGGREGATED, AND INDIGENOUS EMOTIONS
The present study found cultural differences in pleasant and unpleasant emotion on virtu-
ally all types of assessment (global, online, and recall). Consistent with cultural norms
regarding the value of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, European Americans and Hispanics
displayed the highest levels of pleasant emotion and the lowest levels of unpleasant emotion,
whereas Asian Americans, Japanese, and Indians were generally lower in pleasant feelings
and higher in unpleasant feelings. In general, the different measures resulted in similar con-
clusions in that the rank order of the groups was preserved across the methods of assessment.
With regard to specific emotions, we observed the greatest cultural differences in mea-
sures of pride. In particular, the three Asian groups, especially the Indians, reported consid-
erably lower levels of pride than European Americans and Hispanics, regardless of type of
assessment. Guilt also exhibited large cultural variability, with Japanese and Asian Ameri-
cans generally reporting the most guilt. These cultural differences are consistent with theo-
ries suggesting that European American and Hispanic culture, in general, emphasize pleas-
ant feelings regardless of whether such emotions are engaging or disengaging. In contrast,
Asian cultures typically emphasize engaging emotions and de-emphasize disengaging emo-
tions, regardless of the valence of such emotions (Kitayama et al., 1995, 2000). Thus, it is not
surprising that European Americans and Hispanics would display the highest levels of pride
320 JOURNAL OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
TABLE 5
Standardized Beta Weights From Regressions
Predicting Recalled Emotion From Online and Global Measures
Standardized Betas
Pleasant Emotion Unpleasant Emotion
Online Global Online Global
European American 0.61*** 0.27** 0.56*** 0.31**
Asian American 0.37*** 0.47*** 0.41** 0.39**
Japanese 0.44*** 0.26*** 0.22** 0.34***
Indian 0.36*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.37***
Hispanic 0.18* 0.52*** 0.17* 0.52***
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
(pleasant, disengaging) and relatively low levels of guilt (unpleasant, engaging), whereas
Asians would display less pride and more guilt.
The present study also included indigenous emotions and found that these specific emo-
tions did not form separate clusters from the dimensions of pleasant and unpleasant affect
that are common to Western theories of emotion. It is possible that the sampling of other
indigenous emotions might reveal a different structure, but this remains to be explored in
future research. Naturally, the indigenous emotions do include specific content that is not
included in other emotions. However, the indigenous emotions that were studied would not
alter general conclusions at the level of pleasant and unpleasant affect.
Positive and negative emotions. Characterizing emotions simply as positive or negative
has come under attack in recent years because these global assignments can oversimplify the
emotion domain, especially in the cross-cultural context where what is considered positive
or negative may vary. It should be noted that a positive cluster and a negative cluster emerged
in each culture, although pride clustered with the negative emotions in India. Presumably, in
each culture people view events as either desirable or undesirable, and react with either
pleasant or unpleasant emotions, respectively. Pleasant and unpleasant emotions may be uni-
versal reactions to events that are seen as either beneficial or detrimental to a person’s goals
and well-being. At the same time, the present findings confirm earlier speculations that cer-
tain specific emotions such as pride may be considered pleasant or unpleasant in particular
cultures. Thus, the positive and negative emotion categories may be useful in a cross-cultural
context, but care must be taken as to which emotions belong to these categories.
MEMORY FOR EMOTIONS ACROSS CULTURES
The present study demonstrated that global ratings of affect figure prominently in peo-
ple’s memories of their emotions. For pleasant and unpleasant emotion, there was a sizeable
association between global and recalled affect across the cultural groups, even after control-
ling for online affect. These results are even more remarkable considering that the global and
retrospective measures have no overlap in time frame. Furthermore, the present study was a
conservative test of the influence of self-concept on memory because participants in
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TABLE 6
Standardized Beta Weights From Regressions Predicting Recalled (Frequency)
of Emotion From Online Frequency and Online Intensity Measures
Standardized Betas
Pleasant Emotion Unpleasant Emotion
Online Frequency Online Intensity Online Frequency Online Intensity
European American 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.82*** 0.13
Asian American 0.47*** 0.39*** 0.57*** 0.19
Japanese 0.47*** 0.15 0.58*** 0.21**
Indian 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.50*** 0.40***
Hispanic 0.09 0.45*** 0.52*** 0.00
**p < .05. ***p < .01.
experience sampling studies are more likely to attend to their own emotion states and thus
should be unusually accurate in remembering them.
The present findings also underscore the need for experience sampling measures in cross-
cultural studies of emotion, particularly in studies of clinical phenomena. Whereas cultures
did not differ significantly in online reports of unpleasant emotion (particularly sadness),
they differed in global reports of unpleasant emotion. Overreliance on retrospective mea-
sures could indicate cultural differences that are not apparent in daily experience.
Although global affect serves as a source of information when recalling emotion, regard-
less of culture, interesting cultural differences emerged in the degree to which intensity pre-
dicted recall (of frequency). Hispanic Americans weighted intensity of pleasant emotion
quite heavily, giving no weight at all to the intensity of unpleasant emotions. Indians placed
relatively greater impact on intensity of pleasant emotion but equally weighted the frequency
and intensity of unpleasant emotions. We speculate that the differential influence of intensity
on emotion recall is one mechanism through which cultural and individual differences in
subjective well-being reports might emerge, but clearly more research is needed. Unfortu-
nately, emotion scales often ask respondents to report the amount of emotion experienced,
without differentiating between frequency and intensity of emotions. In future research, it
would also be informative to ask respondents to recall the intensity of their emotions.
Unexpected differences. An unexpected finding was that cultures differed in online re-
ports of pleasant emotion. This finding was inconsistent with Oishi’s (2002) study. However,
in a study by Mesquita and Karasawa (2002), Japanese students rated everyday emotional
events as less pleasant than American students. Nevertheless, because we did not have any
theoretical predictions for online differences, this finding needs to be interpreted with cau-
tion. Furthermore, given the dearth of cross-cultural investigations of online emotions, we
cannot make any definitive conclusions about online differences until the finding has been
replicated. One possibility is that online differences are sample-specific; therefore, obtain-
ing several diverse samples in each culture should be a goal for future research.
Conceptual overlap. Do global self-beliefs of emotion predict memory for emotions sim-
ply because the constructs are conceptually related? Global, online, and recalled assess-
ments of emotion bear some conceptual overlap. After all, a person who was very happy dur-
ing the experience sampling week probably typically feels happy and therefore has global
beliefs about the self that include a lot of positive emotion. And naturally, people’s memory
and global self-beliefs are grounded in reality to some extent. However, the present study
demonstrated that there are systematic biases in memory, and these biases can be accounted
for by a person’s global self-concept. Future research should try to separate these constructs
through experimental mood manipulation to determine whether recall can still be predicted
from global affect.
Identifying the processes of emotion recall. Based on Robinson and Clore’s (2002a) the-
ory, heuristic information may “fill in” when individuals lack concrete, episodic knowledge
(see also Roediger & McDermott, 2000). However, another possibility is that strong norms
for particular emotions in some cultures may also increase the use of heuristic information.
The present data do not speak to the distinction between these two processes, although this
question deserves some attention in future research. One way to examine this in future
research is to have participants recall their emotions under different conditions of cognitive
load or following cultural priming manipulations. If use of heuristics is driven by memory
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decay, we would expect a greater correspondence between the global self-beliefs and recall
when recall takes place under cognitive load. If use of heuristic information is driven by cul-
tural norms, then we might observe stronger associations between global self-beliefs and
recall after priming cultural norms.
Choice of emotions. Our findings are limited to the extent that our grouping of emotions
into the dimensions of pleasantness versus unpleasantness is a meaningful way of organizing
the data. However, based on structural analyses of emotions (e.g., Kim-Prieto et al., 2003;
Scollon et al., in press; Watson et al., 1984), we believe there was sufficient justification to
make the pleasantness-unpleasantness distinction in all five cultural groups. Furthermore,
we took care to include in our PE and UE indices only those emotions that exhibited com-
mon structure across the five groups. Although alternative ways of organizing the data do
exist, the current dimensions of pleasantness and unpleasantness, nevertheless, lend a useful
framework for interpreting the present set of findings. In addition, our findings are limited to
the extent that our selection of emotion terms was representative of the emotional lives of
the different individuals from different cultural backgrounds in our study. It is possible that
the inclusion of additional indigenous emotions terms would alter our findings. However,
because our goal was to examine whether self-concept influences memory for emotions, we
found it necessary to use the same emotion terms across cultures.
Sample characteristics. This study was a first effort to use multiple methods of assess-
ment, including experience sampling, to study multiple cultural groups. However, some
caveats about our samples are worth noting. First, we elected to treat the three within-U.S.
groups separately, given past research on ethnic differences in emotion and well-being (e.g.,
Matsumoto, 1993; Okazaki, 1997, 2000) as well as strong ethnic differences in mean levels
of emotions in the present study (see Figure 1 and Table 4). One weakness was that ethnicity
was also confounded by geographical differences, leaving open the possibility that group
differences were due to geography rather than ethnicity per se. To our defense, however,
Schkade and Kahneman (1998) did not find any differences in self-reported life satisfaction
between Midwesterners and Californians. Furthermore, our own findings converge with the
conclusions of these cultural groups based on global reports of emotion (e.g., E. Diener,
Diener, et al., 1995). Second, males were somewhat underrepresented in all our samples.
However, for all groups, there were more males than females, so any cultural differences that
emerged are unlikely due to gender differences. Finally, we did not have even sample sizes
for our five groups. These uneven sample sizes present a problem only for the multivariate
hypothesis testing, and even so, a simple observation of the means for each culture on the
specific emotions suggests clear differences. The uneven sample sizes do not present a prob-
lem for regression analyses or for cluster analyses because these analyses were conducted
within each culture separately. In these analyses, the sample size only affects the stability of
the coefficients and the dissimilarity matrices (on which the clustering was performed) in the
same way that sample size influences the stability of a correlation coefficient.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
Despite the inevitable limitations of a single study, the present research is the first to
assess emotional experiences in five cultures using the experience sampling method and
sampling indigenous emotions. Several important conclusions emerged and point the way
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toward intriguing lines of inquiry for future research. First, pleasant and unpleasant emo-
tions emerged in all five cultures, although pride grouped with the unpleasant emotions in
India. Second, indigenous emotions in India and Japan clustered with Western emotions and
did not form separate clusters. Third, the different methods gave some approximate order-
ing of the groups, but online methods (especially for negative emotion) showed smaller cul-
tural differences than recall methods. The greatest cultural differences emerged in measures
of pride. Fourth, there were interesting recall biases for emotions, suggesting that although
global self-beliefs influenced recall in each of the cultures, different groups used different
types of self-belief information in recalling emotion.
NOTES
1. We assessed emotion recall in terms of the frequency of various discrete emotions, but we could compute
intensity and frequency from the online ratings. From the online reports, we defined frequency as how often people
feel emotions, regardless of the strength; intensity was defined as the average intensity of emotion the people report
on those occasions when they do feel them.
2. Of course it is possible for people to feel pride about others, but this is not the typical default sense of the word
(see Kitayama et al., 2000).
3. Kim-Prieto, Diener, and Fujita (2004) tested the effect of language on emotional experience using emotion
ratings from multiple sites in various countries. At some sites, participants responded in their native language,
whereas at other sites, participants responded in English. Using hierarchical clustering, they found that samples did
not cluster by language, but instead clustered according to geographical region. Both the Indian sample that com-
pleted English measures and the Indian sample that completed Bengali measures were closest in the clustering to
each other and China. The Indian sample that used Hindi measures clustered with the United States and Australia—a
finding better explained by exposure to Western culture (because that specific sample was drawn from a business
school) rather than language, because Americans and Australians completed measures in English.
4. Participants completed mood ratings directly on a personal digital assistant that also served as the signaling
device, with the exception of participants in India who wore alarm watches as the signaling device and completed
identical measures in paper-and-pencil form. Watch alarms were programmed to occur roughly once every 2 to 3
hours, 5 times a day. Participants in the Indian sample turned in their forms each day to guard against any late
reporting.
5. Proud, affectionate, joyful, happy, irritated, guilty, sad, and worried were translated into Japanese by
Shigehiro Oishi, a native Japanese speaker who is familiar with Japanese translations of emotion words used in pre-
vious cross-cultural research (e.g., Kitayama et al., 2000; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). Furthermore,
Kengo Takeno, a Japanese Ph.D. student in psychology at International Christian University in Tokyo, checked the
Japanese translations and made minor changes to ensure accuracy. The Japanese emotion terms were hokori, aijo,
ureshii, shiawase, iraira, zaiakukan, kanashii, and sinpai, respectively.
6. In the cases where the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated, a Kruskal-Wallis test yielded par-
allel results.
7. To create a dissimilarity matrix, we first created a correlation matrix among the frequency of specific emo-
tions (this number was 12 for the Japanese and 10 for the Indians). We then subtracted each element of the correlation
matrix from unity (1 – r) to form a dissimilarity matrix of 12 × 12 for the Japanese sample and 10 × 10 for the Indian
sample. All clustering was performed on these dissimilarity matrices.
8. We were unable to test for any gender by culture interaction effects due to instability in estimates with moder-
ate sample sizes. However, for the samples that were somewhat larger, we conducted within-culture tests of gender
effects. Japanese males and females did not differ on any of the measures. Among Indians, significant differences
emerged between males and females, F(1, 150) = 7.46, p < .01, such that females (M = 2.98, SD = .79) reported
greater intensity of online pleasant emotion than males (M = 2.65, SD = .58), and females reported greater intensity
of online unpleasant emotion (M = 2.35, SD = .79) than males (M = 2.10, SD = .62). Marginally significant differ-
ences emerged for global and recalled unpleasant emotion that were in the direction of females reporting more
unpleasant emotion. A marginally significant difference emerged for frequency of online unpleasant emotion, such
that males reported feeling unpleasant a greater proportion of time than females.
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